

# Multinationalization and the Scope of Innovation

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## Abstract

This research sheds light on how multinationalization affects basic research by firms and how their product scope influences this relationship. Using a matched firm-patent dataset, we apply the generality measure of patent citation to investigate the effect of multinationalization on the extent to which patents registered by firms are applicable to diverse technology fields. We find that multinationalization is generally associated with less fundamental patents. However, engaging in more international activities while operating a more diversified portfolio of products is conducive to patents that open the way for follow-up research and inventions. The finding is robust to various specifications and sampling tests.

**Keywords:** Multinationalization, Product scope, Patent generality, Fundamental innovation

**JEL Code:** F12, F14, F23, O32.

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# 1 Introduction

Innovation is increasingly acknowledged as a key source of firm competitiveness in the global economy. It is well known that globalization has enabled new ways for producing goods, i.e., international fragmentation, which is in general accompanied by different forms of cost savings that arise from specialization gains or lower production and transport costs. On the one hand, a higher level of offshoring as a response to a need for short-term cost-saving measures skews firms away from innovating at high levels. On the other hand, geographical segmentation of production has widened the sources of knowledge spillovers that lead to important innovations. How these forces have shaped the creation of new knowledge by firms remains unexplored in the literature.

An element crucial for innovation and productivity growth often neglected in literature is the characteristic of patents produced by firms. Patents applicable to diverse technology fields are considered to be more fundamental and hence of higher quality because they open the way for follow-up research and inventions. Forming a matched firm-patent dataset, we explore this feature of patents by measuring the extent to which the application of patents registered by firms can be spread across different product lines. To this end, we use patent citation data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to determine the pervasiveness of firms' patenting activities by applying the generality index of patent citations introduced in Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997). COMPUSTAT segmented data is then used to identify the extent to which multiproduct and multinational operations affect this characteristic of innovation by firms.

Our empirical findings suggest that a larger share of offshore activities negatively impacts the broadness of patenting activities by a firm. However, combining multinationalization with the number of product lines reveals a contrasting picture in which an increase in international operations by firms with a wider product scope has an offsetting effect and induces them to produce patents that are more general than those generated

by firms with fewer product lines. In other words, our estimations show a positive and highly significant interaction effect between multinationalization and the number of product lines. These findings are robust to the choice of variables and methodology, as well as to sampling and endogeneity issues.

The applicability of firms' patents across diverse technology sectors can be associated to basic research or fundamental innovation, which is in turn closely related to large spillover effects within and across industries and therefore productivity growth (Akcigit, Hanley, and Serrano-Velarde, 2013).<sup>1</sup> Patents deliver monopoly profits, but their citability may not seem important for achieving short-run gains. However, the quality of patents ends up impacting many parameters vital for continued progression of innovation dynamics that produce new technological and economic paradigms. Decisions to offshore based on immediate cost pressures may get in the way of such critical innovations necessary, for example, for the development of the large-scale optoelectronic integrated circuits that insure continual advancement of microprocessor speed (Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2009). At the same time, the existence of technological spillovers through multinational activities that increase firms' incentives and capability to undertake fundamental innovation is an undeniable phenomenon with a large body of evidence in the business and economic literature, see e.g. Branstetter (2006), Castellani and Zanfei (2006), and Keller (2010).

Introducing firms' product scope into the picture allows us to highlight the interplay between multinational and multiproduct operations. To this end, we aim to unify two branches of international trade literature, namely multiproduct firms and innovation (Dhingra, 2013) and multiproduct firms and offshoring (Eckel and Irlacher, 2015), to investigate how a firm's geographic and product scope interact to determine its innovation scope.<sup>2</sup> The idea is to bring in an international context the diversity hypothesis

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<sup>1</sup>Fundamental innovation is defined as a creative idea that leads to follow up research and development (Gupta, 2007) or a basic research that opens the way for many other inventions (Elwell, 2013).

<sup>2</sup>For seminal work on trade and multiproduct firms see Eckel and Neary (2010), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011), Qiu and Zhou (2013), and Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014).

put forth by Nelson (1959) that states “broad technological base insures that, whatever direction the path of research may take, the results are likely to be of value to the sponsoring firm.” A firm with a broad technological base is better able to absorb knowledge from international markets. A wider set of products or a larger portion of the value chain can therefore generate advantages from basic research upon multinationalization, as international learning spillovers are better exploited through a larger product scope. As a result, increasing international operation by firms with more products gives them more opportunities and incentives to produce high quality patents. This explains both a higher value for basic research and an increase in investment in fundamental innovation by more diversified multinational firms.

Three underlying assumptions based on empirical evidence build our conceptual framework. First, a substantial part of the core research and development by multinational firms is carried out in their home country. OECD (2007) reports that only 11.5% of R&D by US multinationals in 1994, and 13.3% in 2002 were being conducted abroad; moreover, those R&D were adaptive in nature to serve local markets (see also Picci, 2010). The home country bias pertains more to fundamental innovation also because it is higher for firms with diversified technology portfolios that are well positioned to realize knowledge spillovers between different technology fields (Belderbos, Leten, and Suzuki 2013). Second, cost-reducing fragmentation of production induced by globalization is associated with a myopic view by firms to face increasing competition from international markets. This in turn reduces the value of basic research and discourages fundamental innovation (Liu and Rosell 2013; Arora, Belenzon, and Pataconi 2015; Bournakis, Vecchi, and Venturini 2016). Third, globally-engaged firms are more productive than domestic firms as they can exploit channels of learning from the foreign markets (Bernard and Jensen, 1999), accessible external R&D in other regions (Peri, 2005), collaborative R&D and joint ventures with foreign firms (MacGarvie, 2006), learning by doing across international affiliates (Brambilla, 2009), or feedback from their intra-firm worldwide

pool of knowledge or from suppliers, customers, and universities (Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter, 2010).

The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data and the respective measures used to characterize innovation. Section 3 delivers our empirical results, while Section 4 concludes.

## 2 Data

To lead our empirical study, we form a matched firm–patent dataset from two main sources: Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database of granted patents. We source our firm-level data from COMPUSTAT annual fundamentals, which report a rich set of economic and financial information on the publicly traded firms in the U.S. over the years 1964 to (currently) 2010.<sup>3</sup> For our exercises, we especially make use of the following set of information:

- annual sales (*SALE*),
- annual R&D expenditures (*XRD*),
- and annual advertising expenditures (*XAD*).

To focus on products and innovation in the conventional sense, we restrict ourselves to those firms in COMPUSTAT that report their main activity as manufacturing (SIC 2xxx and 3xxx). To make the direction of trade clear, we also restrict ourselves to firms that are headquartered in the U.S. (*FIC*="USA").

We also construct from COMPUSTAT a set of controls that will accompany our econometric specifications. The first one is a firm’s stock of R&D as proxy for the firm’s knowledge capital at the time of innovation. Following Hall (1990), we construct the

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<sup>3</sup>Made available by Wharton Research Data Services at <http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/>.

R&D stock in a firm using the perpetual inventory model

$$R_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)R_t + XRD_{t+1},$$

in which  $\delta = 0.15$ . For the first year of a firm, we compose the R&D stock using the proposition by Hall (1990) and write  $R_0 = XRD_0/(\delta + 0.08)$ .<sup>4</sup> We also pursue the stock of a firm's commercial advertisement as a possible signal that the firm intends to engage in more specialized and commercial innovations. In view of the findings by Clarke (1976), which suggest that the effective lifespan of advertising expenditures is less than a year (a 100% annual depreciation rate), we set the stock equal to  $XAD$ . The values of  $XRD$  and  $XAD$  are turned into real terms using annual deflators from the NBER manufacturing database. Finally we use the deflated value of annual sales as a measure of size.

We source information about the granted patents from the USPTO patent database. These data include a diverse range of information about patents including the year of application filing and the year patent was issued, the patent classification code, plus information about the assignee and the citations made. The data covers all granted patents from 1901 to 2010. We convert the patent classification code provided with the data into the technology classification introduced by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) for a benchmark study of technological diversity among citations (leading to 37 technology fields). We only use the utility patents and match them to firm level data by the firms' identification code (*GVKEY*) using the dynamic links provided by the NBER Patent Citation Data (specifically the data file *dynass.dta*). For our analysis, we believe that the application year of a patent has stronger correlation with the actual time of innovation, therefore we utilize this year variable in our matching process instead of the granting year. In fact, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) find an average lag of

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<sup>4</sup>Firms appear in COMPUSTAT once they go public, which leaves open the possibility that the firm was operational before its first appearance in the data.

two to three years between the year a patent is applied for and the year the patent is granted, which justifies our choice.

Our main explanatory variables of interest are, of course, the number of products and the share of offshore operations. To construct these two measures, we make use of COMPUSTAT segmented data. These data in part provide information on a firm's business segments, defined as a firm's operation in distinct 4-digit SIC areas. The segmented data coverage is more limited than the annual file and only spans 1976 to (currently) 2010. Additionally, from 2000 onwards, Standard & Poor requested that firms report operation segments instead of business segments. These operation segments pertain to state-by-state report of a firm's operation in the U.S. and do not reflect products. Hence, we take care not to use those years.

Focusing on the segmented data, we are inclined to treat each four-digit business segment in a firm as a product, a definition which is broader than what is traditionally used in the literature. But, we believe that such broad description of products, as opposed to the narrower 7-digit SIC, is advantageous to our investigations. Our main focus is the applicability of patents (or innovations) to various different fields; therefore, we need to make a certain degree of distinction between products to see the real diversity of applications. For instance, in the manufacturing of glass containers (SIC 3221), a patent can be easily applied to the subgroups of glass bottles, carboys, fruit jars, etc. with minor adaptations. It takes innovations of more fundamental nature to apply the same patent to both glass bottles (SIC 3221) and pressed and blown glassware (SIC 3229), the latter pertaining to a range of products including (but not limited to) glass artworks, dishes, lanterns, and trays.

Using the basis above, our first measure for the number of products is simply the count of 4-digit business segments for each firm in a certain year ( $N$ ). This count could still be crude for our purpose and does not especially take into account how distant and diverse products in a firm are. For example, we would want to make a distinction between

a two-product firm that produces glass bottles (SIC 3221) and glassware (SIC 3229) and another two-product company that produces glass bottles (SIC 3221) and plastic bottles (SIC 2821). We are hypothesizing that the latter firm would require a larger investment in basic research to reduce the costs of its both products. Therefore, our adjusted measure counts 3-digit business segments but weights them by the abundance of 4-digit segments within each 3-digit group, so that the measure better reflects the diversity of products. Let the following Herfindahl index be a measure of product diversity:

$$H = 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N3} \left( \frac{\#(\text{Same 3-digit SIC})_n}{N} \right)^2,$$

in which  $N3$  is the simple count of 3-digit segments. Then, the adjusted number of products is

$$N^H = N \times H + 1.$$

Let us look at the two extreme cases: when  $H = 0$  (no diversity at 3-digit level), then  $N^H = 1$ , that is, the firm is producing products that are more or less the same. With perfectly even distribution of products among different 3-digit product lines,  $H = 1 - 1/N$  and  $N^H = N$ ; products are so diverse that each one counts as a distinct line in this definition.

In addition to business segments, the segmented data also reports sales by geographic segments. Each geographic segment describes the operation of the firm in a distinct geographic location (country is the minimum level of separation). One obvious geographic segment is the U.S. division, especially since we are only focusing on U.S. headquartered firms. Firms do not report the details of their overseas operation in a consistent manner, therefore, we aggregate all foreign operations and only focus on the domestic versus international operation of firms.<sup>5</sup> Specifically, our definition of international presence is

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<sup>5</sup>In the segmented data, some firms only report their total overseas activities, some others report it by the continent of operation, and a few firms segment activities by each foreign country.



the share of total sales by the affiliates overseas, or more formally:

$$S = 1 - \frac{\text{Annual Sales originating from the U.S. Segment}}{\text{Total Annual Sales}}.$$

Table 1 lists the composition of our analysis sample by year. As mentioned earlier there are quality issues with the segmented data of year 2000 and afterwards, therefore, we restrict ourselves to the unbalanced panel of firms belonging to the years 1985 to 1999.<sup>6</sup> There are more than 2,000 firms per year in the panel, and these firms generated more than 17,000 patents a year, with the number of patents increasing over the years. Almost one-third of the firms in each year are multiproduct ( $N > 1$ ), and the proportion increases to about half the firms in the ending years of our sample. The proportion of firms with international operation ( $S > 0$ ) varies through the years but is still a substantial proportion of the total.

The simple counts of firms in Table 1, however, do not convey the full picture. The distribution of firms by the number of products and also by their share of international operation is highly skewed. Figure 1 shows the distributions by pooling all firm-years in the sample. Almost 98% of firm-years in our data have four products or fewer, while only 0.4% of firm-years have at least seven. Similarly, for more than 96% of firm-years at least half their production is in the US, while only 0.6% of firm-years are fully operating overseas with only headquarters in the U.S.

## 2.1 Measuring the Quality of Patents

The mainstream literature on innovation has not yet offered one standard definition of patent quality or its scope of applicability. We use two measures introduced by Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997) which we believe have a good degree of correlation with our notion of patent quality, and we use them to robustly test our hypothesis.

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<sup>6</sup>We also repeat our regressions with a more balanced panel of firms that appear for at least 10 years in our sample and our results remain robust.

Year	#Firms	#Patents	#Multi-product	#Multi-national
1985	2,759	17,153	783	981
1986	2,865	18,104	823	932
1987	2,889	19,364	845	887
1988	2,793	19,766	832	839
1989	2,726	19,581	815	777
1990	2,724	20,331	836	750
1991	2,806	21,303	888	727
1992	2,920	23,065	944	742
1993	3,052	28,660	1,000	727
1994	3,183	27,933	1,086	731
1995	3,439	33,145	1,180	716
1996	3,500	30,797	1,235	697
1997	3,383	31,047	1,229	702
1998	3,223	34,198	1,375	1,107
1999	2,622	33,694	1,501	1,195

Table 1: The count of firms and patents in the data by year. Multiproduct firms are those with more than one 4-digit product line ( $N > 1$ ). Multinational firms are those with non-zero share of international operation ( $S > 0$ ).

What follows is a brief description of each measure we use.

– **Generality**

Our main indicator of patent quality is the generality index introduced by Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997). In effect, this index is driven by the diversity of citations made to a patent in their technological fields. Formally,

$$GENERAL = \frac{XG}{XG - 1} \left( 1 - \sum_k \left( \frac{XG_k}{XG} \right)^2 \right),$$

in which  $XG$  is the total number of citations to a patent, and  $XG_k$  is the number of citations to the patent in technology class  $k$ . The term  $XG/(XG - 1)$  adjusts for the estimation bias (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001, Appendix 12). The index is




Figure 1: The distribution of firms by the number of products and international share of operation.

essentially a Herfindahl one which returns values closer to one when citations are received from a wide array of different technology fields, leading to the notion that the patent is applicable to very diverse fields. In this regard, there is a tight correspondence between this index and our idea of patent applicability. We classify patents using the first two digits of the USPTO patent classification codes to form the index, but we also rely on the technology classes defined by Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997) (from now on referred to as HJT) for comparison and robustness check.<sup>7</sup>

The shortcoming of the generality index is that it is forward looking. Due to the truncation of our patent information in 2010, we are bound to miss some future citations. The problem escalates for patents granted in later years. Given that patents can receive citations up to 20 years since their inception (Hall et al., 2001), we anticipate some under-estimation in our generality measure. To check robustness, we also resort to a backward looking measure of patent quality described below.

### – Originality

Along with the generality of a patent, Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997) also

<sup>7</sup>We further experiment with classifying patents using the first digit of USPTO classification system but do not report the results. These results are weaker but still in the same direction as with the other indexes.

define the originality of a patent by the diversity of technological fields that the cited patent embodies. It is true that diversity in citations made does not guarantee diversity in future use, but it is quite possible for patents drawing on a diverse range of fields to get applied to the same diverse fields. The measure is defined as

$$ORIGINAL = \frac{XO}{XO - 1} \left( 1 - \sum_k \left( \frac{XO_k}{XO} \right)^2 \right),$$

which, similar to the forward measure, is basically a Herfindahl index.  $XO$  is the total number of patents cited, and  $XO_k$  is the number of cited patents in technology field  $k$ . The term  $XO/(XO - 1)$  is similarly used to adjust for the biases.<sup>8</sup> The benefit of using the originality index is that it is backward looking and we observe all patent information as early as 1901, so that the truncation issue does not show up here.

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for our key variables. Foremost, the results of the table show that the generality and originality indexes have by and large similar distributions. Regarding the number of products, our firm-years have anything between one to 11 products. The median values for the number of products and the share of international operation again confirm the skewed nature of the distribution and put most of the firm-years in our sample in the class of single-product firms and those firms with very small international presence. Given that the firms in the data are public firms, we are not surprised to see that most firms in sample exhibit quite large turnovers. We also notice that many firm-years in our sample do not spend anything on R&D or advertisement during a year, though, there is much variation in research and advertising activities amongst the sample firm-years.

Table 3 looks at cross-correlations between the key variables. The correlation co-

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<sup>8</sup>The original adjustment proposed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) also subtracts  $1/(XO - 1)$  from  $ORIGINAL$ . However, when the Herfindahl index is zero (which is a very likely event) this latter adjustment returns negative values for originality causing infeasibility in our estimation processes, so we dropped the last term. We also experiment by subtracting this last term from every patent except from those with zero originality, and the results we get are qualitatively the same but somewhat weaker.

Variable	#Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
<i>GENERAL</i>						
USPTO	321,767	0.465	0.322	0	0.524	1
HJT		0.398	0.320	0	0.426	1
<i>ORIGINAL</i>						
USPTO	332,672	0.431	0.335	0	0.5	1
HJT		0.373	0.328	0	0.4	1
$N$	44,884	1.532	1.058	1	1	11
$N^H$	44,884	1.490	0.968	1	1	10.1
$S$	44,884	0.101	0.185	0	0	1
$SALES$ (\$mil)	44,884	1,090.8	27,844.5	0	448.6	3,504,234
$R$ (\$000)	44,884	93.3	773.9	0	2.238	36,590.1
$A$ (\$000)	44,884	15.6	481.7	0	0	43,939.8

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the measures of patent quality and other firm characteristics. Statistics for patent quality are at patent level (for those patents that could be matched to a firm), and statistics for the other variables are at firm-year level.

efficient between the different indexes of generality and originality is about 0.2 to 0.3, which points to a positive yet non-overlapping relationship between the two indexes. At the same time, the generality index shows a positive correlation with the number of products but a negative correlation with the share of international operation. These preliminary findings do not account for the possibility of interaction between the two factors.

The last point to take from the table of correlations is that the relationship between  $N$  and  $S$  is not an obvious one. To explore the relationship in greater details, we compute the distribution of firms by their number of products and share of international operation which is shown in Figure 2. It seems that the proportion of multi-product firms increases initially with more of operation moving to overseas. However, as  $S$  grows beyond 0.3 the porportion begins to fall. The full pattern fails to suggest a strong and monotonic relationship between the two variables.

	USPTO <i>GENERAL</i>	HJT <i>GENERAL</i>	USPTO <i>ORIGINAL</i>	HJT <i>ORIGINAL</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>N<sup>H</sup></i>
<i>GENERAL</i>						
HJT	0.814					
<i>ORIGINAL</i>						
USPTO	0.248	0.205				
HJT	0.210	0.279	0.826			
<i>N</i>	0.015	0.013	0.001	-0.007		
<i>N<sup>H</sup></i>	0.017	0.020	-0.003	-0.005	0.943	
<i>S</i>	-0.039	-0.030	-0.007	-0.002	0.099	0.040

Table 3: The table of correlations between the key variables. Observations are at patent level (for those patents that are matched to firms).

### 3 Empirical Results

#### 3.1 Econometric Strategy

With the necessary variables in place, we are now able to test these implications for our panel of firms with various levels of multinational operation and different number of business segments. In particular, we are investigating the impact of product range, as measured by  $N$  or  $N^H$ , and the impact of multinational operation, as measured by  $S$ , on the quality of patents. Exploiting the interaction between the two effects, we also determine the impact of operating in a larger range of product lines on the learning capability of firms engaged in international markets, and therefore the overall effect of the latter on the patent quality.

We estimate those effects using the following linear model<sup>9</sup>

$$PAT_{ij,t+2} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log(NP_{jt}) + \alpha_2 S_{jt} + \alpha_3 \log(NP_{jt}) \times S_{jt} + X_{jt} \beta + \mu_i + \tau_t + \iota_j + \xi_{ijt}, \quad (1)$$

<sup>9</sup>Since our indexes are bounded between zero and one (with non-trivial mass of zeros), a more appropriate method of estimation would be the fractional response model of Papke and Wooldridge (1996), in which a probit transformation of the linear model is estimated instead using maximum likelihood. However, we find that the estimates of marginal effects from the linear and probit estimations are almost identical, while the linear model is much less computationally intensive (Appendix A.3).




Figure 2: The distribution of firms by their number of products and share of international operation.

where  $PAT_{ijt}$  is one of the indexes of quality for patent  $i$  by firm  $j$  in year  $t$ . In our specification,  $NP_{jt}$  represents the number of products and will be replaced by either  $N$  or  $N^H$  in our estimations. Vector  $X_{jt}$  is a set of covariates that would also influence the patent quality. We primarily use log of real sales, R&D stock and advertising expenditures. Since there is a considerable number of observations in our sample with either zero R&D or zero advertising (see Table 2), we transform R&D stock and advertising expenditure not by taking logs, but by applying the following inverse hyperbolic sine transformation proposed by Burbidge et al. (1988):

$$r_{jt} = \log \left( R_{jt} + \sqrt{R_{jt}^2 + 1} \right), \quad a_{jt} = \log \left( A_{jt} + \sqrt{A_{jt}^2 + 1} \right).$$

There are a number of dummies that we use in our specification. In case patenting in certain fields inherently requires a higher degree of generality for instance, the effect is absorbed by the technology class dummies,  $\mu_i$ . We are careful that the technology classes used for the generation of dummies and the index on the left-hand side always match. We also control for the effect of business cycles by including year dummies,  $\tau_t$ .




Figure 3: The count of times the number of products changes in a firm during 1985–1999 and the distribution of firms over these changes.

Finally, industry-dependent variations are absorbed by industry dummies,  $\iota_j$ .

In specifying our econometric model, we especially allow for a two year lag between the patents and the firm characteristics. In doing so, we notice that current evidence points to an average gap of one to two years from research to innovation (see Pakes and Shankerman, 1984, for instance). By implementing the two year lag, we endeavor to make a closer connection between patents and the circumstances that gave rise to them.

We intentionally refrain from using firm fixed effects as close to 70% of the firms in our panel do not change their number of products during the observed sample period at all and over 90% change fewer than three times (Figure 3). One can therefore think of  $N$  as a fixed effect dummy, which does not change with time. It would therefore clash with any additional fixed effect factors added to the specification due to collinearity. Note that our regressions are at patent level and clustered at firm-year level. Our model does not intend to observe the dynamics of how a firm changes over time, but the generality of a patent in a given year based on firm characteristics.



### 3.2 Estimation Results

We use OLS with noise clustering to estimate the coefficients and their standard errors in model 1. Given the existing background about the individual impacts of product range and multinationalization on the quality of patents, we see fit to build up our evidence by first trying to replicate the existing findings elsewhere before presenting the full model.

In column (1) of the table, we only include  $S$  and observe that a higher level of multinational operations is conducive to lower generality in patents. This is in line with the hypothesis that offshoring activities are aimed at short-term cost saving rather than on restructuring and diverting resources towards more fundamental innovation activities. In columns (2) and (3) we look at the relationship between product range and patent generality and find very small and statistically insignificant effects. Combining both aspects in column (4) and (5) does not change the picture, and the previous findings still apply.

In columns (6) and (7), we estimate the full specification by also adding the interaction terms. Inspecting this last set of results reveals an interesting pattern: we estimate a positive and significant effect for the interaction term. This can be related to the hypothesis that learning possibilities multiply as firms operating in more product lines increase their international presence, eventually masking the negative effects of the geographic segmentation of firm activities on fundamental innovation. The interaction term in our specification tests for this prediction and obtains a positive effect in columns (6) and (7) of the table. This can be thought of as extending Nelson (1959) to an international context in that firms with a more heterogeneous portfolio of products engage in more fundamental innovation because they can better exploit technological spillovers from international markets. Calculating the total effect of  $S$  on patent generality shows that a higher share of offshore activities increases the latter if a firm is active in more than three product lines.

In the last two columns, we conduct a robustness test by estimating the same model

Variable	USPTO Generality						HJT Generality		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$S_t$	-0.025*** (0.009)			-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.025*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.009)
$\log(N_t)$ (SIC 4-digit)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.015*** (0.004)		-0.011*** (0.003)	
$\log(N_t^H)$ (Herfindahl)			0.000 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.002)		-0.015*** (0.004)		-0.011*** (0.004)
$\log(N_t) \times S_t$						0.040*** (0.010)		0.022** (0.009)	
$\log(N_t^H) \times S_t$							0.043*** (0.011)		0.030*** (0.009)
$\log(SALE_t)$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
$r_t$	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
$a_t$	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)
Adj. $R^2$	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.050	0.050	0.061	0.061
$F$	74.8	73.8	74.1	73.8	74.0	75.1	75.4	105.6	105.3
Log Likelihood	-83979.6	-84007.4	-84008.2	-83978.3	-83979.6	-83934.7	-83934.6	-79118.6	-79115.8
#Obs	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628

Table 4: The OLS estimates for the indexes of generality as dependent. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by firm-year. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*, and \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A set of dummies for year, industry and patent class are also included, but not reported. The sample is at firm-year-patent level.

but using as the independent variable the generality index that we constructed from the HJT classifications. We do not find any change in the implications in this last set of results.

A few control variables are also part of the estimated model that are reported in the table. These variables also show some direction. Notably, a larger stock of R&D leads to more general patents. We explain this outcome as such that, being of a breakthrough nature, more general patents are more likely to require larger and costlier investments. We also hypothesized earlier that higher advertising is to be associated with lower generality by indicating that the firm is more market-oriented, and the figures from the table are in support of the hypothesis.

### **3.3 Endogeneity of International Operations**

One issue casting doubt on the reliability of the results found in Table 4 is the possibility that the quality of patents is in fact influencing the decision by firms to operate overseas in the first place. We know from trade literature that endogeneity is likely to act in the extensive margin because only a subset of firms self-select into becoming multinationals, see for instance Helpman et al. (2004) and Alfaro and Chen (2012). This can be due to a fixed innovation cost a firm has to bear in order to become multinational (Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas, 2012). This type of endogeneity would be embodied by firms that switch from fully domestic operations to multinational operations (a move from  $S = 0$  to  $S > 0$ ). One would therefore generally think of the relationship between investing in basic research and becoming a multinational to be positive. In our case, we have shown that multinationalization has a negative effect on the generality index. For reverse causality to be an issue we could think of firms that tend to focus on more specialized (adaptive or organizational, not fundamental) innovation being better fit to go abroad because they can more easily adjust to new markets and organize their value chain across countries.

Number of Changes in $N$	All firms	No switching		Switching to multinational
		Multinational	Domestic	
0	3810	937	2505	368
1	798	212	384	202
2	328	59	164	105
3	147	32	61	54
4	60	12	27	21
5	25	6	7	12
6	14	1	8	5
7	6	2	1	3
8	1	0	0	1
9	2	0	0	2
Total	5191	1261	3157	773

Table 5: The count of firms by the number of changes in product numbers for firms staying domestic or international constantly and for firms that switch from domestic to multinational at some point.

The possibility of this (negative) reverse channel for causality can act as a source of bias in the estimated results of the previous section and needs to be addressed. Before all, we have already taken steps to minimize the extent of this bias in model (1) by maintaining a two-year gap between the dependent and independent variables. We also observe that by increasing the time-gap the results actually improve.

Our robustness check involves the exclusion of all firms that switch from being fully domestic ( $S = 0$ ) to multinational ( $S > 0$ ) during the sample period. Also recall that the majority of our firms hardly ever change their number of products. Table 5 shows the distribution of firms by the number of changes in  $N$  and also by the behavior of firms in switching from domestic to multinational or maintaining their status throughout the sample. To make our point in more details, we conduct a series of exercises by re-estimating equation (1) while restricting ourselves to different samples listed in Table 5 and comparing the results. These results are shown in Table 6.

The estimation in column 1 is based on the sample of firms that do not switch status,

Sample	No switching			Switching to
		multi-	Unchanging	Multinational
Variable	(1)	nationals	product number	(4)
$S_t$	-0.103*** (0.017)	-0.095*** (0.022)	-0.109*** (0.017)	-0.030** (0.013)
$\log(N_t)$ (SIC 4-digit)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.013*** (0.005)
$\log(N_t) \times S_t$	0.084*** (0.021)	0.096*** (0.027)	0.113*** (0.023)	0.030*** (0.012)
Adj. $R^2$	0.055	0.053	0.055	0.051
#Obs	52,373	29,313	45,698	268,255

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$S_t$	-0.106*** (0.017)	-0.097*** (0.022)	-0.113*** (0.017)	-0.029** (0.013)
$\log(N_t^H)$ (Herf )	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.013** (0.005)
$\log(N_t^H) \times$	0.097*** (0.022)	0.104*** (0.029)	0.130*** (0.024)	0.033*** (0.012)
Adj. $R^2$	0.055	0.053	0.056	0.051
#Obs	52,373	29,313	45,698	268,255

Table 6: The OLS estimates for the USPTO generality index using different restricted samples to minimize the endogeneity effect. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by firm-year. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A set of controls are also included, but not reported. The sample is at firm-year-patent level.

that is, remain either fully domestic or multinational during all years. We find that all of our previous findings stay robust with this treatment. Using  $N^H$  instead of  $N$  as the indicator of product number does not affect the implications.

In column 2 we further restrict the sample to firms that have been multinationals in all years, and we manage to obtain the same results. There is only some deterioration in the statistical significance which was expected as a result of sample reduction.

In column 3, we focus on firms that neither switch their geographical status nor their number of products (measured in  $N$ ). This column by definition also deals with possible endogeneity bias in the interaction term of our baseline regression. Interestingly, we find that not only the prior implications do not change but also they become more nuanced.

Column 4 offers another view for our argument above. In this column, we restrict our sample to those firms that switch from being fully domestic to becoming multinational at some point within our window of years. We specifically note that the coefficients for the key variables are all smaller in their absolute values, compared to the other columns, despite having the same signs. The change suggests to us that our prior results could have been affected by some endogeneity bias, however, the bias is positive for  $S$  and negative for  $\log(N) \times S$ . The endogeneity is mainly captured by the act of switching from  $S = 0$  to  $S > 0$  and removing the bias only makes our results stronger.

The discussion so far concentrated on the effects of  $\log(N)$ ,  $S$  and  $\log(N) \times S$  separately, as if these variables are independent of each other. To see a picture that accounts for the interdependence, we use model (1) from Table 4 to predict the changes in the generality index as a function of  $N$  and  $S$ , keeping all other variables fixed at their means. Figure 4 illustrates the prediction results when the number of products ranges from one to six and the share of international operations varies between zero and one.

It is evident from the picture that single product firms are the ones with the most general patents when operation is restricted to be fully domestic. Multiproduct firms with domestic operations tend to be generating patents with lower levels of generality




Figure 4: The index of patent generality as a function of  $N$  and  $S$ , keeping other variables fixed at their means.

as their number of products becomes larger. However, once international operation is allowed, the lead by single product firms quickly erodes. When more than 40% of firms' activities go overseas, the rank begins to reverse, and multiproduct firms are the ones to introduce the more general patents, whereas the same index plunges for the single product firms with an increase in the share. In the limit when all of a firm's activities take place overseas ( $S = 1$ ), single product firms are generating the least general patents.

### 3.4 Self-citation Affecting the Results?

We also contemplate that self-cited patents might be irrelevant to our study as they could be attempts to increase the patent count or mainly intended for litigation, hence, of very low innovation value. To investigate whether the results obtained in the previous sections might be driven by this quality issue, we did a robustness check by excluding all self-cited patents. We define a self-cited patent in the strictest sense: as the one that has at least one citation to another patent with the same assignee. Even with this definition, we find that fewer than 5% of all the patents matched to our firm data can be classified as self-cited. Moreover, only one percent of the citations by these patents are made to self-patents on average. Unsurprisingly, excluding the self-cited patents and

Variable	USPTO Originality		HJT Originality	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$S_t$	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.046*** (0.014)	-0.049*** (0.014)
$\log(N_t)$ (SIC 4-digit)	-0.014*** (0.005)		-0.011** (0.005)	
$\log(N_t) \times S_t$	0.034*** (0.012)		0.017 (0.011)	
$\log(N_t^H)$ (Herfindahl)		-0.013** (0.006)		-0.011** (0.005)
$\log(N_t^H) \times S_t$		0.037*** (0.012)		0.027** (0.011)
Adj. $R^2$	0.056	0.056	0.050	0.050
$F$	88.20	88.21	89.42	88.65
#Obs	331,503	331,503	331,503	331,503

Table 7: The OLS estimates for the index of originality as dependent. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by firm-year. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A set of dummies for year, industry and patent class are also included, but not reported. The sample is at firm-year-patent level.

re-estimating the models did not have any conspicuous impact on the results.

### 3.5 Originality of Patents

We also investigate the robustness of our results by considering the index of originality as the measure of patent quality. As we already explained in Section 2, compared to generality, the index of originality has the advantage that it does not suffer from year truncation that affected the computation of generality index. Nonetheless, it has a weaker correlation with our notion of patent applicability across multiple distinct fields. We estimate model (1) through a OLS estimation using the indexes of originality as dependent variable. Table 7 reports these results.

The overall picture offers the same insight as the results in previous tables. The share



of multinational operations and the number of products are still negatively affecting the originality in the same way as they affected generality. The interaction of the two factors, however, increases the originality of patents. Most of these effects enjoy a solid level of statistical significance.

## 4 Conclusion

In this paper, we analyze the effect of multinationalization and firms' product scope on the quality of patents by measuring the applicability of patents, i.e. their citation, across different technology fields. We link this characteristic of patents to fundamental innovation as an output of basic research that can be utilized across different product lines. To this end, we build evidence on previous findings regarding the negative effect of offshoring as a short-term cost saving strategy on basic research, but additionally show that multinationalization of firm activities increases fundamental innovation by firms engaged in a diversified portfolio of products. We relate this to the fact that operating in international markets nurture learning spillovers, which can increase in magnitude when a firm is active in a broad range of activities. The results reveal that firms' product scope plays a decisive role in determining how the geographical fragmentation of firm activities impacts their incentives to engage in basic research.

We conclude that firms with a larger share of multinational operations active in a larger range of product lines tend to better exploit learning due to the heterogeneous nature of their knowledge and conduct more fundamental innovation. In contrast, firms with less product lines that geographically separate their operations focus on less basic research or patents that produce less spillovers across industries. The findings suggest the hypothesis of Nelson (1959) going global in the sense that firms operating in diverse industries are able to do more research of a fundamental nature because they can better internalize the benefits of technological spillovers arising from multinational activities.

A natural direction for future research would be to link the spillovers brought about

by fundamental innovation to productivity growth. Upon the availability of geographically segmented data, a next step would be to study the impact of the characteristics of the destination (production location) of multinational firms. For example, patent protection can be an important institutional factor in firms' business decisions over the introduction of new products and processes (Ivus, 2015). More detailed research on the location of R&D that gives rise to innovations of different scopes is another attractive path to pursue.

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## A Appendix

### A.1 COMPUSTAT Data

Our firm-level data originates from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT which is actually a collection of various data. We particularly make use of two sources in COMPUSTAT: fundamental annuals and historic segmented files.

To focus on manufacturing, we use the firms’ report of their Standard Industry Classification (SIC) associated with their main activity. We only keep those firms whose SIC falls in the range 2000 to 3999. We form a list of firms headquartered in the US from COMPUSTAT annual fundamentals ( $FIC=“USA”$ ) and match it by the firm identifier  $GVKEY$  to our segmented firms, then drop all firms in our segmented file that cannot be found in the other list.

Each segment (business or geographic) for a firm is reported with a segment ID ( $SID$ ) which is unique within firm and the segment type. Some segments are reported with  $SID = 99$ . We find that most of these segments do not report any sales and pertain either to administrative and corporate activities or to discontinued and non-operational segments. We use the segment names ( $SNMS$ ), that in most cases provides a description of the segment operation, to filter those that are not productive. The keywords we use to flush these segments are:

ADJUSTMENT, CORPORATE, DISCONTINUED, DIVESTED, ELIMINATED, FOREIGN, HEADQUARTER, INTERNATIONAL, INVESTMENT, (RE)CONSOLIDATED

Some firms in the data submit more than one report per year for the same segment, updating the previous reports. We are only using the most recent report in these cases. At this point, it is straightforward to count the number of business segments ( $STYPE=“BUSSEG”$ ) as the number of products,  $N$ . We use the sales ( $SALES$ ) reported for the US segment ( $STYPE=“GEOSEG”$  and  $GEOTP = 2$ ) over the total sum of sales to construct our measure of internationalization,  $S$ .

We later add R&D ( $XRD$ ) and advertising ( $XAD$ ) expenditures from COMPUS-TAT annual fundamentals. Annual GDP deflators obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) are used to turn both expenditures into 2000 dollar values. At this point we have the key variables and the controls needed as explanatory variables.

## A.2 Patent Data

We obtain the source file provided by the US Patent and Trademark Office reporting more than four million granted patents from 1901 to 2010. The data is administrative, hence, requires some processing and cleaning before being used in the econometric applications. In what follows, we describe the steps we take to get the data ready for our use.

We fetch the following information from the main body of data:

- patent number,
- assignee code,
- date of filing application,
- patent class and subclass.

The data also provides the date patent was issued, but as we explained in the text, the issuing date is not an accurate indication for the time of innovation.

For benchmarking with other similar works, we only keep utility patents. These patents often relate to the invention of a new method or device. The selection excludes all design patents (number or class starting with the letter ‘D’) that register the ornamental design of a functional item and plant patents (number starting with the letter ‘P’ or class starting with letters ‘PLT’) that register a whole plant. We also drop patents with numbers starting with the letter ‘H’. The USPTO explains that these patents are not real inventions but statutory ones, claiming an invention as prior art and preventing

others from patenting it. However, we keep patents whose numbers start with letters ‘RE’. These are reissued patents that fix omissions and errors in the original filing of an earlier patent.

The classifications for the utility patents are then standardized into technology codes according to the conversion table in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, Appendix 1). The list of citing and cited patents are, in turn, matched with the patent numbers and the corresponding technology codes. Computing the generality and originality indexes is straightforward as per instructed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).

The final stage is matching the patents to firms. Firms in COMPUSTAT are identified by unique GVKEY codes. We first use the file `pat76_06_ipc.dta` from the NBER Citation Data project (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) to bridge assignee codes to another identifier, PDPASS. Then using `dynass.dta` from the same project, we are able to link PDPASS to the GVKEY of the assignee. In the process, we use the first GVKEY (GVKEY1) in the list as it is the first assignee in the chronological order and most likely associated with the inventor. Once the link between a patent and its GVKEY is established, linking patents to firm characteristics is just a matter of merging by GVKEY.

### **A.3 Extension to Empirical Results**

A peculiarity of the dependent variables, namely, the indexes of generality and originality, is that both are bounded between zero and one (inclusive). Such variables are termed as fractional response variables. Estimating a linear model ignores these constraints and might generate a flatter curvature by under-estimating the coefficients. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose to estimate a probit transformation of (1) in a bid to effectively enforce these constraints. The estimation then proceeds by applying a maximum likelihood estimation. We estimate a fractional response version of our main model to see whether the replacement of our linear model with a nonlinear one justifies the increased computational intensity. The estimated coefficients are listed in Table 8.



Comparing these result to those in Table 4, we find them to be almost identical, that is, our linear model is already doing a job at least as good as the fractional response model.

Variable	USPTO Generality		HJT Generality	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$S_t$	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.025*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.009)
$\log(N_t)$ (SIC 4-digit)	-0.015*** (0.004)		-0.011*** (0.003)	
$\log(N_t) \times S_t$	0.040*** (0.010)		0.022** (0.009)	
$\log(N_t^H)$ (Herfindahl)		-0.015*** (0.004)		-0.010*** (0.004)
$\log(N_t^H) \times S_t$		0.043*** (0.010)		0.029*** (0.009)
$\log(SALE_t)$	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
$r_t$	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
$a_t$	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)
Log Likelihood	-173,014.8	-173,014.9	-168,546.0	-168,544.8
$\chi^2$	7,190.8	7,215.3	7,299.8	7,260.5
p-value	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
#Obs	320,628	320,628	320,628	320,628

Table 8: The average marginal effects from the estimation of a fractional response model of generality index. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by firm–year. \*\*\* and \*\* indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. A set of dummies for year, industry and patent class are also included, but not reported. The sample is at firm–year–patent level.